SPEECH GIVEN BY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PEACE, LUIS CARLOS RESTREPO, AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE SENATE DURING THE DEBATE ON THE PEACE PROCESS WITH THE SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS

Senate of the Republic

August 3, 2004

"I was invited here today to present to this corporation a detailed balance of the peace process we are carrying out with the self-defense groups.

I was delighted to be given this opportunity and I am pleased to present to you a report on the ground covered so that, within your constitutional jurisdiction of exercising political control over the President's actions, you will have the chance to assess the efforts we have made in the matter.

Let me say, first of all, that it has been a titanic task. Because of some kind of national dementia, of collective stupidity in Colombia , intellectuals and sectors related to the search for a negotiated solution had taken on the erratic opinion that it was possible to seek a negotiated solution with the guerrilla groups, but it was not advisable or justifiable to do so with the paramilitary groups.

Big historic mistake. We have the recent example of what happened during the previous administration. While enormous efforts were being made to reach a negotiated solution with the FARC and the ELN, the government decided to close this possibility to the self-defense groups and even reached an agreement with the guerrilla groups that the only action possible in this case was for the State to use force against the sectors that were destabilizing society.

The consequences came soon after. Crouching in the shadows, these groups systematically torpedoed the search for a negotiated solution with the guerrillas. The process was just beginning with the FARC when the negotiating table underwent its first paralysis, precisely due to a dreadful massacre committed by the groups at the beginning of President Pastrana's administration. And what about the systematic bombardment of the self-defense groups against the attempt to carry out a process with the ELN. Everybody knows that these groups were actively working to prevent the possibility of agreeing with the ELN on the possibility of a region to hold the meetings or a negotiation zone to hold the conversations.

Well, this government has had to overcome that historic stupidity. When we proposed the possibility of holding conversations with the paramilitary groups at the beginning of this administration, almost all the intellectuals and specialists on the matter stood up and said it was impossible. I still remember today a book written by the former peace commissioners titled "To Uribe's Ear", which was given to us when he took office. When asked if a negotiation with the paramilitary groups was possible, all my predecessors said no in unison, and so I said to myself: well, I will have to do something that is impossible. And here we are.

The advantages of having an open process of negotiation with the self-defense groups are enormous. first of all, starting with acknowledging the fact that peace in Colombia is a three-way process, -- or as the Vice President once said--, a chair with three legs. We will be able consolidate peace if we can carry out the process with the FARC, the ELN and the self-defense groups all at the same time.

This process is a complex one. First of all because of the lack of understanding of the nature of the phenomenon. The political opposition sectors irresponsibly say that it is a negotiation between me, myself and I, that the only thing the government has to do is agree at night and in the shadows with those who have been its friends throughout history; and by saying this, they are completely discrediting our efforts and sending a misguided message to the international community, to the national community, and what is worse, to the self-defense groups themselves.

They do not see that the self-defense groups are perhaps the most serious problem of governability that the Colombian state has at the present time.

I do not like the term paramilitaries much because it evokes a reality that, although it was confirmed some years ago in many Latin American countries, it does not adjust to what we have in Colombia right now. Paramilitary means military apprentice, subject to the military, directed by the military. And it turns out that the self-defense groups in Colombia, for a long time now, have their own agenda, they have their own negotiation, they have, even if we do not like to admit it, their own social foundation that is developing by competing with the legitimacy of the State.

No, they are not our partners. The self-defense groups are our worst enemies, and even more so because they are wearing the vestments of justice and democracy, twisting the sense of democracy.

How good it would be to begin to understand that at a negotiating table with the self-defense groups, we are discussing institutional legitimacy, inch by inch, with groups that are taking possession of territories and taking possession of the consciences of citizens to try to impose their own order and their own version of justice.

How lonely it is at the table when, as in my case, I have to defend society and institutions with the lack of understanding of this same society and the same institutions themselves. How sad it is when the work you do day in, day out, quietly to represent the legitimacy of the State is distorted by a group that does not understand the dynamics of that legitimacy.

So let's start by acknowledging how difficult it is. Let's start by understanding that these paramilitary groups have a very high perception of themselves, a self-justifying discourse similar to that of the guerrillas, and just like the guerrillas is killing and kidnapping people in the name of social justice, these groups are murdering and intimidating people in the name of justice and democracy. They, themselves, think they are justice. They complain that there is no institutional justice, but their justice is a cartoon, their justice is revenge, their justice divides the Nation, their justice commits outrages against the viability of Colombia.

Yes, they think they are the heroes of democracy. The country is shocked right now because Mr. Mancuso, Mr. Baez and Mr. Isaza shouted at the top of their lungs that they consider themselves the saviors of this democracy. Well, that's what I've been hearing for 18 months quietly at the table. It is so good for everyone to hear it, to hear that reality that no one has wanted to hear; it's good for everyone to realize the dimension of the problem. It's good for everyone to realize nationally and internationally, many people consider them the worse criminals, in the regions where they operate, many citizens consider them heroes and saviors.

So many people have approached me over the last 18 months saying: Commissioner, the government is going to make a big mistake, do not demobilize the self-defense groups; without the self-defense groups, we will be left at the hands of the guerrillas. So many of these people of good faith are wrong. It is very serious that so many people in Colombia trust the efficiency of paramilitary justice more than the efficiency of institutional justice. They come up to me and say the thing is that the self-defense groups do work, you show them who the thief is and the next day, the problem is solved; but if you tell the police who the thief is, they hold him for two days and then let him go.

Are we aware of this serious flaw in our democratic education? Are we aware of the fact that the citizens themselves, with their sensationalism are the ones who justify the actions of the self-defense groups? Are we are of the enormous cultural transformation that must take place?

It would be great if so many valuable sectors in this country, instead of sitting and watching from the sidelines and being suspicious of the government and being suspicious of the Commission, who is doing everything possible, would help us in this last struggle for democracy and educate citizens in order for us to cross over from these primitive systems of revenge to the institutional systems of justice and security.

Yes, we deserve the self-defense groups that we have now, for having a ruling class that is so apathetic to the people's security problems. Because for years it was prohibited to speak publicly of a security policy, because when Alvaro Uribe dared to speak of a security policy for the first time, the same editorialists as usual came out and said: that is a hostile, right-wing discourse that has no future in Colombia. Yes, because for many years, dialog was mistaken for being friendly with the violent groups.

Here, commissioners were going out to drink Whiskey with the guerrillas and ambassadors were delirious to go get their picture taken with a man in camouflage with a rifle in his hand. Here, people have thought that carrying out a negotiation is to take little messages, to treat delinquents kindly, even if they are political delinquents. Because the country has lacked the courage to defend its citizens and the courage to carry out negotiation policies, too.

It's a good thing, historically, that this government was able to position the security matter; and it was un-demonized, and now you can speak openly about how citizens should cooperate with the public forces; and if they do not cooperate with the public forces, then they wind up cooperating with the paramilitaries, and if they do not cooperate with the public forces, then they wind up putting together a gang in their neighborhoods to apply justice by their own means. And yet today, there are still NGOs that demonize our policy.

Well, that's exactly why this government has put the cards on the table and said that a dialog policy must be accompanied by the recovery of legitimate force, because we are convinced that peace in Colombia is the product of the proper and accurate adjustment between legitimate military pressure and persuasion and dialog.

That is why it has been possible to open this process and tell the self-defense groups: if you ever historically argued that the State was not defending your rights, that argument is no longer valid. There is a State willing to defend your rights and you have the historic chance to give up that social atavism of legitimate defense. There is no longer a place in Colombia for legitimate defenses. In the social State governed by the rule of law, no one can defend themselves. No, the social state governed by the rule of law follows the principle of solidarity with legitimate public forces, and only they can carry weapons by constitutional mandate. Only they can legitimately exercise these functions of security.

It has been very difficult during these months to convince the self-defense groups. Just as an anecdote: we took quite a few months to make the self-defense groups understand that they were a problem. They did not consider themselves a problem. They thought they were the solution; and with amazing naivety, some of them would say to me: Commissioner, the solution is very simple. Leave us the region we have and legalize us. We will take care of it for you; because in their opinion and their reasoning, they could not under stand that what they were doing was illegitimate.

But we made progress. It was a slow and difficult process, but we did it and for the first time, these groups began to consider the possibility of demobilization, which was a vague horizon at the beginning.

So in the middle of last year, we were able to establish clear and defined objectives for the process, because unlike what many hotheaded editorialists say, this process has clear, simple and attainable objectives: The strengthening of the State governed by the rule of law, the consolidation of the arms monopoly in the hands of the State, the total demobilization of the self-defense groups and their reincorporation to civilian life, and of course, the construction of the conditions for the State and only the State to provide security to the community.

Between July 15, 2003 and May 13, 2004, we have signed five agreements with the self-defense groups. These agreements clearly indicate where we are going. The problem is that you know this country has amnesia and it not only forgets the past, but it also forgets the present. The government made an enormous effort for the self-defense groups to sign these agreements, and they have already been forgotten. Everyone gives in to the media impact of a self-defense group leader who comes up with a negotiation proposal one day and another one the next.

Perhaps this is due to the fact that there was a different advisor for each session, and because not much is said about the agreements signed, which is the only clear and established direction. What the leaders of the self-defense groups think or say is one thing, but the documents signed by them are something different altogether. I do not stand by hypotheses and I am not concerned about those made by the self-defense groups, I stand by to what has been signed.

The first agreement between the United Self-defense Groups of Colombia and the National Government is the "Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement to Contribute to the Peace of Colombia", signed in Santa Fe de Ralito, Tierralta, Córdoba on July 15, 2003.

I'm simply going to read the first two points of the agreement to show how clearly it defines where we are going. The National Government and the Self-defense Groups hereby agree: "One, define as a purpose of this process the achievement of National peace by strengthening democratic governability and the reestablishment of the monopoly of force in the hands of the State". The AUC reiterate that their greatest contribution to the Nation at this historic point in time is to take steps toward their reincorporation to civilian life and contribute to the strengthening of the social State governed by the rule of law. Two: "in order to fulfill this purpose, the United Self-defense Groups of Colombia agree to demobilize all their members in a gradual process, which will begin with the first demobilizations before the end of this year and must end on December 31, 2005 at the latest". The government agrees to carry out the actions necessary for their reincorporation into civilian life.

So the purpose is clear: Achieving national peace by strengthening governability and reestablishing the monopoly of force in the hands of the State. The self-defense groups' agreement is also clear: take steps toward reincorporation into civilian life, contribute to the strengthening of a social State governed by the rule of law, and demobilize all their members before December 31, 2005. They are also ratifying their agreement with the cessation of hostilities; and as if that weren't enough, they share the purpose of a Colombia free from drug trafficking and support the actions of the State against this phenomenon.

The government's commitments are simple but eloquent: create the conditions to reincorporate the members of the Untied Self-defense Groups of Colombia into civilian life and generate the conditions of security for the communities where they operate.

On November 8 that same year, we signed a document with the Central Bolivar Block, which is now seated at the unified table, where the group also agrees to demobilize all its members before the end of this administration.

On May 13 this year, we signed a new agreement: The "Agreement for the negotiation zone in Tierralta, Córdoba", reiterating the agreement to cease hostilities, establishing that the purpose of the zone is to consolidate the agreements reached and take steps toward defining a schedule for the concentrations and demobilizations of the self-defense groups.

I have a copy here of the original documents with the signatures of the leaders of the self-defense groups at the bottom. I would like to leave these documents here for the corporation.

That's what we go by. That in the midst of the political games and the attempts to obtain more advantages at a negotiating table, the self-defense groups have tried to discredit the importance of these agreements to propose other things to the country: the redefinition of the cessation of hostilities, big national consensus committees. This does not bother us at all, I've said it and I will say it again, these are simply media effects.

The truth of the matter at the table is different: at the table, we go by what has been signed, and at the table, the government has been clear in stating that the only objective is that of the total demobilization of the self-defense groups. And that this government agrees irrevocably to provide security in the zones where they operate.

This has to be clear: there should be no fear in carrying out the process, no more citizens lobbying the government telling us not to demobilize the self-defense groups. Let's open up to the possibility of a collective experience of participative and democratic security, because if Uribe cannot lead a process with these characteristics, I cannot even begin to imagine who can.

It is time to dismantle and demobilize the self-defense groups. They make democracy illegal. They tarnish the image of the government and the public forces. They divide the Nation with their actions of private justice, which are nothing more than revenge. We have the historic opportunity to demobilize these men and of course, to offer them the possibility to return to the bosom of society. There is no reason for doubt here.

I must acknowledge the loneliness in this process. Yes, it is good to say it: there is more than enough international community here to accompany a process with the guerrillas, but they are so very revolted and distant when it comes to a process with the self-defense groups. One of the biggest difficulties of this process was the impossibility verifying the cessation of hostilities from the beginning. We asked the United Nations to help us, and the officials of the United Nations did not understand the magnitude of the task. They were more focused on their schematic perception and their preconceptions. We told them: you have the historic opportunity to have the self-defense forces under control, summon the people, let's implement public tribunals from the first day forward with the support of the international community, to act as a moral pressure on the self-defense groups. Excuses, excuses and excuses, and they complicated things so far that we had to go to the Security Council and put Colombia on the Security Council's agenda to be able to access an efficient mechanism.

This wore us out tremendously. We finally realized that it was useless to knock on those doors. And at the end of last year, we contacted the OAS, and we encountered the good Latin American solidarity of the OAS. Without the distance imposed sometimes by the vision that people have of Colombia , from Europe , the Anglo-Saxon countries, the OAS understood us and at the beginning of this year, we signed an agreement that is worth looking at in detail. An agreement that empowers the OAS in three important fields for the consolidation of peace in the country: the verification of the cessation of hostilities, assistance in the demobilization processes and assistance for the communities in re-institutionalization processes.

After signing the agreement was when all the trouble started. The countries who could have contributed, didn't. Revolt prevailed and we had to start scraping the pot in my office to finally assign the budget to the OAS. That's the truth. Today, the OAS is operating with money we collected in my office.

It would be good if there were more support from the international community for this task that the organization is supposed to carry out. Only by strengthening the Mission of the OAS will we be able to verify the cessation of hostilities.

You are all aware of the fact that the declaration of the cessation of hostilities is a fundamental point within this government's peace policy. We demand from the illegal armed groups that expression of unequivocal political will not to shoot any more citizens or commit outrages against democracy. And only when they express that will, will we be willing to hold conversations.

But the cessation of hostilities is not a miraculous process in a country like Colombia, where the armed structures are federated. The FARC and the ELN as well as the self-defense groups seem more like confederations than anything else. Where the centralized commands are ineffective, where there are links between these illegal armed groups and common criminals and all kinds of mafias. Carrying out a cessation of hostilities is not easy.

I compare the cessation of hostilities with trying to stop a truck coming down a highway with no brakes at 50 miles an hour. You can try to stop it dead, but it will most probably lead to a catastrophe. There is no other alternative than to start shifting the gears, going from fourth to third; from third to second; and from second to first; and start slowing it down to take it over to the side of the road, until you can stop that fierce truck of violence.

What bothered citizens about the process in the Caguan was that the truck kept on going, hitting everyone in its path, while the peace commission and the guerrillas were dialoging on top of the tent as if everything were okay, about what is divine and what is human. No, we got off the tent, we got behind the wheel and we intend to stop that vicious truck. That's why we are interested in the statistics. Now, the government's critics have said that the statistics are not important, that decreasing the number of homicides is not important, that having fewer deaths is not important. How apathetic. We think that it is important for less people to die and that's why we believe that, despite all the difficulties, the cessation of hostilities has been fulfilled.

During the first year of cessation of hostilities, that is, 2003, the number of homicides attributed to the self-defense groups decreased by 44 percent. During the second year, that is, so far in the year 2004, there has been a new decrease of 42 percent in addition to the accumulated decrease of 44 percent. And listen to this: since the Negotiation Zone has been in effect, up to June 15 of this year, the decrease in the number of homicides has been 76 percent. That is to say that the truck is beginning to stop and the mechanism of the negotiation zone implemented to improve the cessation of hostilities, has been working effectively to the extent that in the 45 days that the zone has been in effect, we have reached a historic decrease of 76 percent of the number of homicides in addition to the accumulated decrease of 42 percent in 2004 and 44 percent in 2003.

In addition, in the year 2003, we reached a 61 percent decrease in the massacres attributed to the self-defense groups. And we obtained a decrease so far this year of 57 percent. And since the zone was installed, we have had zero massacres, also showing that it is an effective mechanism, despite the fact that the cessation of hostilities verified by the OAS has not yet begun to function properly.

At this same time today, the OAS is meeting the self-defense groups and the government formally for the first time in Santa Fe de Ralito in order to define a procedure to verify the cessation of hostilities.

So here, the cessation of hostilities must be assessed as a progressive mechanism and not expect the Commission to be a hysterical official who, every time someone is killed in a country, bolts out to publicly threaten that the process is over.

No, Senators. You cannot play tricks in peace processes, because tricks turn out to be expenses. In peace processes, if you make a bet, you have to win it and of course, we have made bets.

The country learned of President Uribe's decision when a distinguished former senator was kidnapped by a self-defense group along the northern Colombian coast and we won the showdown. And yesterday, another showdown began: I have said that the cessation of hostilities has worked, but I also have to tell you the truth about something: this process has things to be ashamed of, scandals, and the biggest scandal in this process has been the confrontation between two self-defense groups from Meta and Casanare, who have terrorized the people, who have become the most serious problem of public order in Casanare and have left countless dead up to now, among the lines of the self-defense groups as well as the civilian population.

With wisdom, patience, tolerance, persistence and care, we have done the impossible to persuade these two groups, both in dialogs with the government, to cease hostilities. All our efforts have been useless. It seems that a wretched obsession with war has possessed them and once in a while come those waves of terror talked about by the national and international press. That's why the President made a clear, emphatic decision yesterday: Mr. Martin Llanos and his peasant self-defense group in Casanare; and Mr. Miguel Arroyave and his Centauros self-defense group operating between Casanare, Meta and other regions in el Llano must demobilize immediately. If they do not do so over the next few days, the government will consider the dialog with them terminated, and I'm not going to say any more, because that is not my job, but a word to the wise is enough.

We are through waiting; we want to recover full institutionality in Casanare and Meta . And not only that. Today, at the meeting held this morning in Santa Fe de Ralito, we have asked two more self-defense groups to demobilize immediately: the self-defense group from Meta and Vichada, under the command of Mr. Guillermo Torres, which operates between Puerto Gaitan and Vichada; the Vencedores self-defense group in Arauca, which has committed horrible homicides over the last few months, among other things, and operates in the Province of Arauca and part of Casanare.

What we want is to implement the first large mega-project of institutional recovery. Zero self-defense groups from Arauca, to Guaviare and Vichada. We do not want self-defense groups in Casanare or Meta. We believe that the time for demobilization has come. No more justifications, no more stories about them defending us from the guerrillas, no more excuses. There is no other way but immediate demobilization, and the State is in the condition, as of this very moment, to fully assume the security of these zones.

Today I made a patriotic appeal to the members of the self-defense groups. I said: the President's decision is not subject to negotiation. The patience we have had for a year with this conflict gives us the moral right to demand immediate demobilization. We cannot leave loose ends. If we demobilize these two groups we have to demobilize their two neighbors also. The self-defense group of Don Guillermo and the self-defense group of Mr. Pablo Mejia. And you, the members of the self-defense groups, have the historic opportunity to cooperate with us in this process and show Colombia and the world that you are willing to make peace.

The government is offering all the conditions to reincorporate the members of these groups into civilian life. We will support them with productive projects, we will support them with psychosocial assistance. No one is going to be left alone here, no one is going to be abandoned here. And for the leaders of these groups, or the members of these groups, who have serious legal problems and whose situation we cannot settle by means of pardons and amnesty, we are offering to maintain them in the zones established by the government where their lives will be fully protected, where they will have all the state support they need while we search for a legal framework that will lead to their demobilization and reincorporation into civilian life.

Get this straight. This is not a new negotiation zone like they said in the papers today. No, there are not going to be any more Santa Fe de Ralitos here. The one we have is enough. The objectives are clear: the leaders of the self-defense groups are there. While they stay in the zone, they are militarily responsible for their men. While they stay in the zone, they are under state control. While they stay in the zone, they are within the framework of legality. In return, we suspend the warrants for their arrest and offer them decent conditions for them to stay there and interact with the national and international society. To be able to fulfill their wishes to explain why they did what they did. But we are not going to fill the country with negotiation zones just because.

I must confess that the self-defense groups have not taken the table seriously with their proposals for new negotiation zones. The proposals they have made have left a lot to be desired and you don't know whether to laugh or cry about them. They make proposals for us to give them four or five thousand square kilometers, supposedly for 300 members of the self-defense groups to stay their in peace while the process is carried out. We have told them: no, members of the self-defense groups, this is not about giving away State territories, this is about recovering territories for the State, which is something different altogether.

Our purpose is to press forward in territorial and institutional recovery. That's the reason for the model we propose between Arauca and Guaviare; between Meta and Vichada. This is all about more zones for the citizens and not just giving away zones for the armed groups. That does not mean that in the processes of demobilization there may be places to concentrate the men for short times while they are trained and prepared for civilian life. But these negotiation zones will have a specific purpose: they will be a means, they will have a limitation in time and they will operate solely and exclusively to enable immediate, prompt demobilization.

The model we are proposing today for the zone in the Llano region should be applied in the rest of the country. I am appealing to you, honorable Senators: Do not forget the Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement of July 15, 2003. Do not abandon me. Help me make the self-defense groups fulfill the agreement to demobilize completely before 2005. Let there be national clamor, let's say that's enough, we do not need them, we will take them in, but they have to dismantle their machinery of war. Do not get tangled up in mermaid songs. Let's not help them get even more confused. Let's transmit to them a firm, coherent image on behalf of institutionality. Let's say firmly: it's over gentlemen, but let's say it with affection and magnanimity, we accept you as citizens. Peace also has a firm hand, big heart formula. And it is important right now to transmit that message to the self-defense groups.

The honorable Congress of the Republic has always shown interest in being associated with the peace processes. I was informed that a committee was established by Congress to attend the processes with the self-defense groups and the ELN. Congress's decision to accompany peace efforts deserves the highest respect, but let me make one thing clear: it is undesirable and wrong for members of Congress, in a personal capacity, to be present at the negotiating table. It does not help institutionality for members of Congress, with an improvised attitude and media and perhaps electoral intentions, try in good faith, but wrongly, to make a scene of this.

I have experienced the shameful situation of finding congressmen seated at the negotiating table, without knowing what they were doing there, who had invited them, whether something had already been agreed with the self-defense groups, whether they were trying to put the squeeze on the government or help in good faith.

That's not right, congressmen, not for you, not for the country. I am asking you, then, on behalf of the President, the President of the Senate, and the President of the Senate's Peace Committee, that if Congress would like to assist in this process, let's do this institutionally. Don't forget that the President is in charge of carrying out the peace processes; don't forget that this topic is closely related to national security. Don't forget that only with authorization from the President can other citizen sectors be present at these tables and have contact with the illegal armed groups.

So let's talk, let's chat, let's take a look, let's analyze and let's find the most efficient, the most prudent mechanism, the one that involves congress the least, the one that best serves its functions of political control, the one that best serves democracy.

I want to make a merely necessary clarification to the Congress of the Republic on Mr. Mancuso, Mr. Baez and Mr. Isaza's visit. I read in a national magazine this week that a distinguished Senator, who is here today, for whom I have the greatest intellectual respect, said that the visit of the members of the self-defense groups had been agreed quite a while ago, and to justify the spectacle, we had hastily brought Mr. Francisco Galan, in order to premeditatedly - which is the conclusion I have reached - open the space for the self-defense groups. No Mr. Carlos Gaviria, you're wrong. You, with your brilliance, with your moral nobility, cannot act on preconceptions. You and I have run into each other at the debates of democracy and you know, Senator, it is just not my style.

It worries and shocks me that these things are said without the least bit of foundation. You, who belonged to the civilian facilitating commission, you went to the mountains to talk to the ELN, should take the time to call Mr. Francisco Galan and ask him under what conditions he came to Congress.

In order to put these facts on record, on May 30, President Uribe again offered the ELN, in Mexico, the chance to begin conversations, subject to the cessation of hostilities, without disarmament or demobilization. Just 24 hours later, the Mexican President said he was willing to assist in the process. 36 hours later, the ELN issued a statement saying that it accepted the Mexican facilitator, and 48 hours later, in the evening of June 2, I got a call from Mr. Francisco Galan, asking me on behalf of the ELN for authorization to come to Bogotá to a forum organized by an international NGO and Senator Rojas Birry, to make a proposal he considered to be of National importance; Mr. Galan told me about the proposal, and the proposal involves a significant change in the ELN so far during this administration.

For the first time, the ELN was willing to talk about peace with Uribe's government; and in the second place, they were willing to deal with the military subject. Although they were talking about a bilateral ceasefire, we can see that they are talking steps toward our proposal of a reciprocal cessation of hostilities, and since there is a process underway, which is advancing quickly, we evaluated the situation with the President and the President said: "I cannot deny the ELN its request. Luis Carlos, give the ELN permission and make arrangements for them to come to Bogotá".

In principle, we knew that the ELN was coming to a forum on antipersonnel mines. That night, we realized that the forum was in Congress. I even spoke to Senator German Vargas Lleras over the phone, who was also unaware of the fact that Mr. Galan was coming to the premises. As a patriotic gesture, Senator Vargas Lleras offered the possibility for the forum to take place. And it was practically a fluke and counter-blow that Mr. Francisco Galan spoke on the premises.

There was no dirty trick there, no ruse. It was a generous gesture of the government to offer the possibility of speaking with the ELN.

And the matter with the self-defense groups had its own dynamics. Senator Moreno de Caro, who is present here today, has a little story, perhaps with more details, on how this proposal came up for the self-defense groups to come to Congress, and Representatives, Eleonora Pineda and Rocío Arias, who were also at the table when the decision was made and who presented to the House of Representatives the request to be approved at the plenary session. You can tell them about it in more detail.

The Government then considered that given the conditions of a negotiation zone that has already been established, where these men would be under State control, we could not refuse to offer this opportunity; and that was what we did. We respected Congress' decision, we offered the opportunity, and history will be the judge of whether it was right or wrong for them to visit this premises.

Last but not least, let me cover one last point. We all know that reincorporation into civilian life of the members of illegal armed groups who have committed crimes against humanity is especially difficult in Colombia . Crimes against humanity cannot be pardoned, they cannot be amnestied. But it so happens that all the leaders of the self-defense groups, all the leaders of the ELN and all the leaders of the FARC have committed crimes against humanity here.

And so, we are faced with an enormous paradox. What do we do with them? Do we sign a peace treaty and put them in jail? Or as some people still believe, do we sign a peace treaty and pardon them?

In the government, we believe that pardon is no longer possible. Times where atrocities were being pardoned, such as when a peace treaty was signed with the M-19, are history, the world has changed. Now the principles of truth, justice and reparation prevail.

We have had to carry out a peace process under the most difficult conditions; but we should not be afraid, if it is for the good of democracy, if it is for the good of reconciliation, let's take the challenge.

Last year, the government presented a bill to begin discussions. You know the story. The First Committee of the Senate held forums. Toward the end of the last legislature, we found an initial version, approved by the Government and accepted by the international community, which proposes that there is a special figure for the members of armed groups who contribute efficiently to National peace, but have committed crimes against humanity: they will be subject to a special tribunal of truth, justice and reparation, which will issue a ruling and after they serve a basic prison term of five to ten years, they will have access to the benefits.

I am talking about a legal framework and the need for a special legislation for those responsible for crimes against humanity, members of illegal armed groups who contribute efficiently to national peace, to subject themselves to a special system that will guarantee full justice, full truth and full reparation. But at the same time, understanding that in this case, it is possible and necessary to grant certain benefits once the basic prison term has been served.

The project was presented during the last term of office, it was finally put on paper, but due to formalities, it failed.

A group of members of parliament of the First Committee asked us to expand the consensus of the project before presenting it again, and the Government has agreed to this request; because we think that a project with these characteristics cannot be rejected simply because of governmental majorities; a project with these characteristics must be the product of a national consensus, and must have great legitimacy to be applied.

This is why the Government is now willing, again, to open social consensus on the project, in order to keep working on what has already been achieved, to perfect it and, then, in mutual agreement, present it to Congress.

One thing is clear to us: All the members of the illegal armed groups who are responsible for crimes against humanity will have to serve a basic prison term. And this includes the leaders of the Self-defense Groups, the leaders of the ELN and the leaders of the Farc. And this is how we see it as a basic demand of society and the international community.

It's good to start providing this pedagogy. It's good that we are not only telling the Self-defense Groups that they have to serve that basic prison sentence. It's good that the facilitators with the ELN are starting to tell the members of the Coce that in this negotiation process -- which will hopefully be opened -- they, too, will have to serve that prison sentence. And it is good for them to tell the leaders of the Farc, too. Because it is going to be a difficult pedagogy.

What is not acceptable is to hear, as I have heard, certain members of parliament who justify the political crimes of the guerrillas, because they believe that this is a noble kind of violence, and they condemn the crimes of the Self-defense Groups because they consider it dirty violence. No, what we are judging here is the crime, not the belonging to the group. And we think this discussion should go on in order to clearly define a legal framework for members of the guerrilla groups and members of the self-defense groups alike, who by contributing to national peace can receive this benefit.

We are glad to have opened this debate, because it had not been done before in this country. Up until the previous administration, this topic had been banned. The agenda with the Farc had 101 points on it and the legal situation had never been taken into account, perhaps because everyone though that it would have ended up in pardon and amnesty, or perhaps because no one was really taking it seriously and no one every really thought about demobilizing. Either of the two is very critical.

When we proposed this debate, we were told that it was premature. It is not premature; the society has to define the legal instruments. As the commissioner for peace, I need to know what to expect at the table.

The Government has said that the legal benefits in this case are not negotiated with the illegal armed groups; it is the democratic society that should define what it is offering. And the only thing I need to know is what I can offer, and the rest will correspond to my job as a civil servant.

To answer the questions: Is the project going to be presented? Yes, when there is a consensus, not within the group that supports the Government, no; an extensive consensus between all the sectors represented in Congress. We see no other way to bring out a law with these characteristics.

What are we going to do about extradition? The Government's position is clear: the topic of extradition is not discussed. It remains the President of the Republic's power and he will be the one to decide when the time comes whether he will apply it or not. Up until now, the President has said: "if the members of the illegal armed groups show good faith and the intention to make amends, there might be generosity among the international community to make a decision in this regard". But the topic is not going to be discussed.

The Self-defense Groups should not get their hopes up, and the illegal armed groups should not get their hopes up: We are not going to sign a treaty against extradition with them, as they have asked me for at the table. We are not going to sign agreements with them against jail sentences. The topic is not and will not be on the table.

But we are generous, and we are willing within the framework of Law 782, and just as we are doing right now in Santa Fe de Ralito, and as it has been done on other occasions in the country, to carry on cautiously, with patience until the time comes to make a decision on the matter.

As for the substitution of crops, we have told the members of the Self-defense groups n many occasions to demobilize and we will make them a part of the tasks carried out to substitute crops and other alternative projects immediately.

What the Self-defense groups cannot aspire to now, as at times they have, is for drug trafficking and drugs to be discussed at the table, and then exchange packages, supposedly of hectares of coca for legal benefits, perhaps in the United States.

They signed a commitment with us on July 15, 2003. The Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement, signed by the Staff of the United Self-defense Groups of Colombia says: "The United Self-defense Groups of Colombia share the Government's intention of a Colombia free from drug trafficking and support the actions of the Colombian State against this phenomenon that is destroying democracy, peaceful coexistence, the economy and the environment".

That is clear. The Self-defense groups fully accepted the Government's drug policy. and the Government will apply it without putting it on the table for agreement, in all its dimension including, of course, the legislation that allows us to seize illegal properties.

Another thing is that if they demobilize and reincorporate themselves into civilian life, we are willing to immediately construct with them, in that region and with the communities that have been affected by the drug problem, alternatives for a decent life, and if there is a possibility for them to become a part of the programs to substitute crops or for the manual eradication of coca plants or Ranger Families or any of these programs, they are welcome to do so.

And finally, Senator Rivera has asked about the ethical and humanitarian threshold. The first of all thresholds, Senator, in order to be able to speak, is for the illegal armed groups to publicly express their willingness to give up violence.

We have said it and we will say it again out loud: "What we have here are terrorist groups, because terrorist groups are those that commit outrages against a pluralistic society and democracy like ours. Here, there are no constitutional or political constrictions to say that someone has to take up arms against the State.

I, too, have a significant intellectual discrepancy with Senator Gaviria: when he thinks that this Government is authoritarian, I think it isn't; I think authoritarianism is defined basically by preventing pluralism; authoritarianism is hegemonic, and if this Government has anything it is a pluralistic horizon, because it has been during this Administration that for the first time historically, the left-wing has made great triumphs as we all know.

Here, I insist, there are no restrictions to justify the use of weapons. It is no longer valid. The justification of political crime is an anachronism. Justifying murder over an idea is shameful. No one should kill under any justification. and he who kills to impose his ideas, is a terrorist, and is doubly guilty of exercising violence because he is exercising it with premeditation and with intellectual support and justification.

But while we vehemently classify those groups as terrorists, we also say to them: we are not fundamentalists in that definition; we simply discredit your methods. And if you give up your methods and you show the political will to give them up, we will open the doors to dialog and construct with you the possibility to improve this democracy.

So, Senator Rodrigo Rivera, that is the first ethical and humanitarian threshold. Here we are going to dialog, but only with those who openly and publicly express their decision to cease hostilities, and therefore, will be, as of that moment, under public surveillance and under the control of society, who will constantly say to them: fulfill your commitments.

What does not make sense, Senator, is when we say that we only dialog with those who are accused of the crime of rebellion or conspiracy to commit crimes, because then all the leaders of the armed organizations would be left out. You have to be realistic. If you want to dialog with the men who are outside the law, you have to accept the reality that it is these groups appoint their leaders, not us.

With new Law 782 passing through procedure in Congress, it was clear that we were going to speak with the illegal armed groups that had a responsible command and sustained influence in regions of our national territory. That is, we went from the subjective, atavistic description of calling the armed groups political groups, to the objective description of International Humanitarian Law that acknowledges that in the contemporaneous world, wars take place over territorial control and there are certain illegal armed groups that want to stay in a certain territory through terrorism.

We talked to those groups; the groups that also, in the terms of International Humanitarian Law itself form a part of the so-called internal armed conflict. The only groups that can be classified as such are the Self-defense groups and the guerrilla groups.

Don't worry. We are not going to talk to car thieves and, of course, drug trafficking groups are excluded.

So that's where the paradox comes in: What happens if the drug traffickers disguise themselves as self-defense groups? I think there are criteria to determine whether it is a disguise or not: the first and the most objective is that they have to belong to the organization. Of course if someone who has been in the world of drug trafficking or in the world of crime belongs to the organization and is in its structure, we have to talk to him or her.

The heroes of revolutions are not exactly saints. One of the most famous heroes of the Mexican revolution was a highway bandit before he became a hero. This happens a lot in these dynamics of armed conflict in nations like our own.

But there is another objective criteria: of course a self-defense group is known for having an anti-subversive or anti-guerrilla ideology, for seeking to impose order, for competing with the State with that order, for trying to interfere in the application of that order, thus becoming a crime against legal and constitutional order as it can be interpreted today, conspiracy to commit a crime to form self-defense groups.

The Justice and Reparation Bill is very clear when it says that only the people who belong to those illegal armed groups can benefit from it and only for the crimes committed on occasion of belonging to the group, never for crimes committed before that.

Some days ago, there was a big national commotion because two famous drug traffickers were in Santa Fe de Ralito. When the journalist from El Tiempo called me to give me the story, I said: "what else is new. I've been with them from the beginning. There are no rats in here, mister". Mr. Pablo Mejia and Mr. Galindo have been at the table from the start; of course they have.

What we are not going to allow is for new self-defense commanders to appear from one minute to the next, no. Those who have been seated from the beginning and are in the organizational structures, of course they are there and we are talking to them.

What's going to happen to them? The situation is unclear. I have told them that the legal mess is enormous, this debate is just starting. The society and this Congress of the Republic will be the ones to finally determine what to do with these people accused of serious crimes and who contribute efficiently to national peace.

So I don't want to give a definitive statement on a debate that is just starting out.

We have asked the leaders of the Self-defense Groups who are at the table to make the names of the people who are in Santa Fe de Ralito public to the country, not because the Government does not know who they are, we know who they are, but we believe they are responsible for telling the nation who they are, because they are receiving a legal benefit in the zone.

So I insist, from these premises, on the request to the Self-defense Groups: I t would be good for them and for the country if we didn't have to tell the citizens. They should be the ones to say who is talking with us for the country to know and, of course, to be able to exercise the civil surveillance required by all democracies in the most appropriate way.

Thank you very much, you are very kind."